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Abstract 
Indonesian government implemented a massive fuel price increase in 2005. While the benefit of 
the reform from efficiency ground had been widely acknowledged, whether such a reform 
was  equitable  still  open  for  debate.  In  this  paper,  this  question  is  answered  using  a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with disaggregated households that allows for 
rich and accurate distributional story. Various counter-factual scenarios analysis of the reform 
is carried out. It suggests that the reform could have been progressive if it increases only 
`vehicle fuel' prices. It, however, tends to increase inequality especially in urban area when 
the price of domestic fuel (kerosene) is also increased. Proper and effective compensation 
matters in mitigating the distributional cost or poverty impact of the reform. A uniform 
cash transfer to poor households disregarding poor households’ heterogeneity tends to 
over-compensate rural but under-compensate the urban poor.  
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1 that the global fuel subsidy could amount to between 250 and 300 billion 
dollars a year, which could comfortably pay off sub-Saharan Africa's entire debt burden and 
still leaves billions of dollars to spare. The fuel subsidy creates a distortion by disregarding the 
economic value of fuel, creating excess consumption and discouraging energy substitution. The 
fuel subsidy has been a constraint on the agenda to switch the future direction of the country's 
energy mix following Indonesia being a net oil importer since 2004. 
The fossil fuel subsidy is also regarded as a major cause of environmental problems, not only 
from the pollution created by excessive fossil fuel combustion by industry and vehicles, but 
also due to excessive traffic and the inconvenience it causes. The fuel subsidy also discourages the 
development  of a more  traffic-free  public transport  infrastructure.  In  most  big  Indonesian 
cities, this is already a major public concern. 
In addition to the above efficiency-related problem, the fuel subsidy is often regarded as 
inequitable. Vehicle owners benefit greatly from the subsidy, and energy pricing reform has 
been widely advocated as a means of promoting efficiency as well as equity. 
However, in the Indonesian context, the biggest concern is the fiscal burden of the subsidy. 
For example, in the year 2000 the fuel subsidy amounted to 40.9 trillion rupiah, or almost a third 
of total central government spending (see Table 1). Since the government always has a political 
constraint with regard to reducing this subsidy, spending has been heavily constrained by the 
fluctuation in the world oil price. 
Table 1: Fuel Subsidy, Government Budget, and Oil Price, 1999 - 2006 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 2006
Fuel Subsidy (Rp Trillion)  40.9 53.8 68.4 31.2 30.0 59.2  89.2 62.7
Government Spending (Rp Trillion)  201.9 188.4 260.5 322.2 376.5 430.0  411.6 470.2
Percent  20.26 28.56 26.25 9.68 7.97 13.77  21.67 13.34
World crude oil price ($/barrel)  17.12 27.07 22.72 23.47 27.1 34.62  49.86 60.32
Source: Ministry of Finance, and U.S. IEA 
When the world oil price started to increase rapidly from 2004 onward, the government saw no 
option but to reform its energy pricing policy radically. In October 2005, the government made 
a big adjustment in fuel prices following a rapid rise in the world crude oil price. So, in the 
end, it was international  market and not the efficiency argument campaigns from energy-
pricing reformists that urged the government to implement the reform. 
Over  the  past  few  years,  reduction  of  the  fuel  subsidy  has  been  one  of  the  Indonesian 
government's main agendas. It has made a gradual reform in energy pricing policy through 
adjustments in fuel prices since the year 1999 (see Figure 1). 3 | P a g e  
 
 
Source:  PERTAMINA 
Figure 1. Price of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, 1999 – 2006 
However, strong opposition from the people and parliament has slowed the reform. Most 
arguments against the reform were based on the concern that an increase in fuel prices would 
translate  into  an  increase  in  other  prices,  and  that  would  reduce  purchasing  power,  and 
exacerbate poverty. The fear was that the rise in fuel prices would create a chain reaction, 
affecting other costs like transportation and other important commodities, thereby hurting the 
economy, and the most vulnerable. 
The reform package was announced on 1 October, 2005, increasing retail fuel prices for 
gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. The price of gasoline was increased by 87.5%, diesel by 104.7% 
and surprisingly kerosene by 185.7%. The huge increase in the kerosene price stirred doubt among 
many economists - who initially regarded subsidy reduction was equitable - over the distributional 
direction of this reform
2 because kerosene is the primary energy source for urban poor. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the distributional impact of energy pricing 
reform using Indonesian experience as implemented in October 2005. Questions to be asked 
among others are whether removing fuel subsidy in Indonesia constitutes a progressive reform; 
whether  the  cash  transfers  that  complemented  the  reform  mitigate  its  distributional  impact 
effectively;  and  what  lessons  to  be  learned  for  mitigating  similar  reform  in  the  future?  
INDONESIA-E3, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with highly disaggregated 
household is used for the analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some relevant previous works. Section 
3 briefly describes the model. Section 4 discusses the scenarios, and the result is discussed in 
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2 Previous Studies 
The World Bank (2006) is the only available study that assesses the distributional impact of 
the October 2005 Package. Other studies do exist but not explicitly analyze the October 2005 
reform. These are Clements, Gupta and Jung (2003), Sugema et al. (2005), and Ikhsan et al. (2005) 
published before the October 2005 package was implemented. 
The  World  Bank (2006)  looks at the impact of the increase in  various fuel prices on 
household expenditure using SUSENAS 2004 data. The result suggests that, in the absence of 
any compensatory measures, the October 2005 package would have led to a 5.6 percentage point 
increase in poverty incidence. Compensation in the form of an unconditional cash transfer to poor 
and near-poor households would, on average, more than offset the negative impact of the fuel 
price increase.  
Ikhsan  et  al.  (2005)  analyses  the  distributional  impact  of  the  March  2005  fuel  price 
adjustment that increased the price of kerosene to industry
3 by 22.22%; gasoline by 32.60%; 
diesel for transportation by 27.27%; diesel for industry by 33.33; and diesel oil and fuel oil by 
39.39%. Ikhsan et al. (2005) used a combination of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model
4 and a simulation using household survey data. The result suggests that poverty rises by 
0.24% without compensation, whereas poverty falls by 2.6% with fully-effective and by 1.89% 
with compensation that is 75% effective (Ikhsan et al., 2005, Table 9). The policies simulated 
reduce inequality slightly. 
March 2005 fuel price adjustment is also analyzed by Sugema et al. (2005) where the 
poverty impact analysis is carried out using a SUSENAS-based micro-simulation, and the 
macro-impact is analysed using an ORANI-based CGE  model.  The result suggests poverty 
would rise by 1.95%. This poverty impact seems relatively high considering the petroleum price 
only rises by 29%.  
Clements et al. (2003) examine the scenario of increasing the price of petroleum products by 
25% using a CGE model. The study suggests aggregate real household consumption falls from 
2.1% to 2.7% following a 25% increase in the price of petroleum products. Urban and high 
income households suffer the most, indicating the progressivity of the reform.  
From methodological point of view, among the weaknesses of those studies is either the 
incompleteness or inaccuracy in the distributional analysis.  In a market economy, the effect of 
a  policy  shocks  on  household’s  welfare  works  through  both  the  market  of  commodities 
(through  changing  commodity  prices)  and  the  market  of  factors  of  production  (through 
changing factor prices or employment). The change in real expenditure of various households 
then  depends  on  both  expenditure  and  factor  ownership  pattern  of  each  of  the  respective 
households. Taking into account either one is only a one-sided story.  This incompleteness could 
be solved by an economy-wide framework, but using a model that has highly disaggregated 
households to maintain accuracy in distributional story. It is very important to acknowledge that 
commodity  prices,  household  expenditure,  factor  prices,  and  household  income  are  all 
endogenous and solved simultaneously in the model. Household’s heterogeneity is also inherent 
and should be integrated in the model. 
The World Bank’s (2006) assessment, for example, is a partial equilibrium story, overlooking 
the factor-income effect. Ikhsan et al’s (2005) study, despite combining a CGE model and a 
micro-simulation, is a top-down approach, where commodity prices are exogenous in the micro-
simulation, and commodity prices from the CGE model is determined by a single representative 5 | P a g e  
 
household. There is no connection between the economy-wide model and SUSENAS micro-
simulation in Sugema et al’s (2005) study. Finally, the Clements et al. (2003) study only based 
on 10 representative households preventing accuracy in distributional analysis. 
The innovation used in the model for this paper is including highly disaggregated households 
into one integrated economy-wide framework. Because the households are classified by centile of 
real expenditure per capita, the model is not only able to capture both expenditure and factor 
ownership pattern of househodlds, but also to assess the distributional impact more accurately. 
The cumulative density function (CDF) of real expenditure per capita before and after the shock 
can be pictured. Therefore, an objective answer to the question of whether a policy shock is 
progressive or regressive is readily available. This model is yet the first of its kind for Indonesia. 
Warr (2006), for example, used this approach for Laos in assessing the poverty impact of large 
scale irrigation investment. 
3 The Computable General Equlibrium (CGE) Model 
The analysis uses INDONESIA-E3 (Economy-Equity-Environment) model, a CGE model 
with a strong feature in distributional analysis. The structure of the model is built based on 
ORANI-G model (Horridge, 2000) with two, among others, important modifications. First is 
allowing substitution among energy commodities, and also between primary factors (capital, 
labor, and land) and energy. In this respect, this model has 38 industries, and 43 commodities 
with  detail  energy  sectors.  Energy  commodities  include  coals,  natural  gas,  gasoline, 
automotive diesel oil, industrial diesel oil, kerosene, LPG, and other fuels. Secondly, multi-
household feature is added to the standard model not only to the expenditure or demand side of 
the model, but also to the income side of the households. Household demand system follows the 
Linear Expenditure Demand (LES) system, where its parameters are econometrically estimated
5. 
The integration of highly disaggregated households adequate for accurate distributional 
analysis is made possible by constructing an Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 2003 
which serves as the core database to the CGE model. The SAM is specially-constructed consisting 
of 181 industries, 181 commodities, and 200 households (100 urban and 100 rural households 
grouped by centile of real expenditure  per  capita).   The  SAM  (with  the  size  of  768x768 
accounts) constitutes yet the most disaggregated SAM for Indonesia at both the sectoral and 
household level. The data used for constructing the SAM include Indonesian Input-Output 
Table, official SAM, and most importantly household level survey data (SUSENAS). Detail 
construction of the SAM can be found in Yusuf (2006) and its structure of the SAM can be 
seen from Table 2. 6 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 2: Structure of 768 x 768 Indonesian SAM 
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4 Scenario and simulation strategy 
Table 3 summarizes the scenarios to be simulated. All of these scenarios are related to the 
October 2005 package of energy pricing reform, i.e., increasing the price of gasoline by 87.5%, 
diesel by 104.7%, and kerosene by 185.7%
6. 
Table 3: Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario  Note 
SIM 1.  NO-KER  October 2005 Package without increasing kerosene price 
(Gasoline 87.5%, Diesel 104.7%) 
 
SIM 2.  ALL FUELS  October 2005 Package 
(Gasoline 87.5%, Diesel 104.7%, Kerosene 185.7%) 
 
SIM 3.  UT  October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers 
to targeted household of Rp. 1.2 million 
SIM 4.  UTUR  October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers 
to targeted household with higher amount to urban 
household and lower amount to rural household 
(100% effectiveness) 
 
SIM 5.  SUB  October 2005 Package with subsidy 
on education and health 
 
The objective of Simulation 1 (SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE) is to see the distributional effect 
had the kerosene price increase not been part of the reform. Many Indonesian economists believe a 
fuel price subsidy benefits the rich more, hence its removal or reduction will hurt them more 
than the poor, and would therefore be considered progressive. This expectation is usually 
based on anecdotal evidence of vehicle ownership where vehicle fuels are an important part of 
the expenditure of the rich. However, because kerosene is an important part of the consumption 
of the poor in urban areas, it may be incorrect too generalize that a subsidy on all types of fuels 
is regressive. In this scenario, the price of gasoline and diesel will be increased, but kerosene will 
be excluded. Compensation is also excluded to examine the initial distributional direction of 
the impact of the subsidy reduction policy. In Simulation 2 (SIM 2 ALL FUELS), increasing 
the price of gasoline is included. Simulation 3 (SIM 3 UT) is trying to mimic exactly what was 
implemented by the government. It is an increase in the price of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, 
plus unconditional cash transfers to targeted households.  
In  all  the  simulations,  initial  or  ex-ante  poverty  incidence  is  based  on  the  official 
SUSENAS-based poverty incidence in 2005
7. However, it transpired that the target of the 
compensation was not only those below the official poverty line, but also those known as near 
poor. The number of targeted households was greater than the number of the ‘officially’ poor. 
Based on the data on the number of recipients of the compensation, the cash transfers in the 
simulation will be given to the lowest 24% of the population in urban areas, and the lowest 
42% in rural areas (twice the percentage of the poor in the respected population). The total 
amount transferred is Rp. 18.3 trillion rupiah
8. 
Another issue that seems missing in the public discussion with regard to the effectiveness 8 | P a g e  
 
of the compensation scheme is the rather simplistic approach of giving the same amount of 
money  to all households  across  Indonesia. As a large country, Indonesian  geographic  nature 
comprising an archipelago of thousands of islands is one of the reasons why price level, for 
example, vary greatly across regions. Simply by using information from the most recent 
household  survey,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  urban  households  will  be  hurt  more  than  rural 
households by any jump in the kerosene price. Therefore, giving more money to urban poor and 
less to rural poor can be regarded as a sensible option. To look at this issue, in Simulation 4 
(SIM 4 UTUR) a slight modification to the scheme is simulated by giving different amounts 
of transfers to urban and rural households recognizing the possibility that urban households 
would be affected more by the reform. Urban households receive 70 percent more and rural 
households receive 30 percent less, given the same budget. 
The compensation scheme being an unconditional lump-sum cash transfer invites much 
criticism.  Giving  a  cash  lump-sum  to  poor  households  with  total  discretion  as  to  its 
spending left up to them can be seen to be a less wise way of helping the poor compared to 
giving  them  education,  for  example.  However,  critics  may  be  missing  the  point  that  this 
transfer is by nature compensation. The idea is to mitigate the adverse distributional effect of 
fiscal and efficiency-motivated reform. To look at this issue, in Simulation 5 (SIM 5 SUB), the 
compensation  budget  with  the  same  amount  is  allocated  through  subsidizing  the  poor’s 
expenditure on health and education, to compare its effectiveness in mitigating the energy 
pricing reform. 
5 Results and discussion 
5.1 Macroeconomic and industry results 
Table 4 shows the impact of various different scenarios on selected macroeconomic variables 
and industry output. In all simulations, industry output falls as a result of the increase in the 
price  of  petroleum  products.  The  increase  in  fuel prices  lowers  fuel  demand  resulting  in  an 
immediate reduction in the output of the refinery industry. The final (new equilibrium) 
reduction in the output of petroleum refineries is around 8 percent (relative to baseline without 
the  reform)  in  all  simulations  except  Simulation  1.  Other  industries  which  experience  big 
contractions  are  those  closely  related  to  the  petroleum  refinery  sector.  For  example,  in 
Simulation 2, these are road transportation (-4.87%), other transportation (-6.62%),  utility 
sectors (electricity by -3%, and water and gas by -4.15%), and some manufacturing industry 
(automotive by -4.4% and rubber and products by -4.91%). After simulating an increase in the price 
of  petroleum  products,  Clements,  et  al  (2003)  report  industries  which  experience a  large 
contraction are similar type of industries to those just mentioned. 
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Table 4: Simulated Macroeconomic and Industry Results (%) 
Scenario  1  2  3  4  5 
Macroeconomic           
Gross Domestic Product (real)  -1.72  -2.67  -2.68  -2.67  -2.42 
Household expenditure  -2.61  -4.03  -4.03  -4.02  -3.65 
Export  -1.72  -2.40  -2.46  -2.45  -2.07 
Import  -2.38  -3.32  -3.40  -3.39  -2.86 
Employment  -3.32  -5.52  -5.53  -5.52  -4.19 
Industry output           
Paddy  -0.57  -1.22  -0.88  -0.97  -0.97 
Other food crops  -1.04  -2.06  -1.81  -1.85  -1.81 
Estate crops  -1.57  -2.81  -2.71  -2.72  -2.39 
Livestock  -1.67  -3.13  -2.91  -2.94  -2.81 
Wood and forests  -0.96  -1.71  -1.69  -1.70  -1.40 
Fish  -1.08  -1.91  -1.76  -1.80  -1.76 
Coal  -0.06  -0.12  -0.12  -0.12  -0.10 
Crude oil  -0.14  -0.16  -0.17  -0.17  -0.15 
Natural gas  -0.19  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.19 
Other mining  -0.52  -0.75  -0.76  -0.76  -0.64 
Rice  -0.52  -1.14  -0.79  -0.89  -0.91 
Other food (manufactured)  -1.91  -3.37  -3.13  -3.16  -3.07 
Clothing  -2.14  -3.71  -3.67  -3.68  -3.23 
Wood products  -1.10  -1.98  -2.10  -2.11  -1.74 
Pulp and paper  -2.32  -3.57  -3.63  -3.59  -2.02 
Chemical product  -2.79  -4.08  -4.02  -4.03  -3.53 
Petroleum refinery  -4.57  -7.93  -7.95  -7.95  -7.85 
LNG  -0.83  -0.79  -0.79  -0.79  -0.77 
Rubber and products  -3.34  -4.91  -5.09  -5.08  -4.35 
Plastic and products  -1.97  -3.16  -3.18  -3.21  -2.80 
Nonferrous metal  -1.09  -1.63  -1.61  -1.62  -1.34 
Other metal  -1.53  -2.19  -2.22  -2.23  -1.85 
Machineries  -3.16  -4.79  -4.95  -4.97  -4.27 
Automotive industries  -3.10  -4.42  -5.02  -5.01  -4.03 
Other manufacturing  -2.36  -3.87  -3.70  -3.73  -3.28 
Electricity  -1.98  -2.99  -2.91  -2.86  -2.60 
Water and gas  -2.98  -4.15  -4.49  -4.35  -3.78 
Construction  -0.15  -0.22  -0.22  -0.22  -0.01 
Trade  -1.95  -3.29  -3.17  -3.14  -2.81 
Hotel and restaurants  -2.13  -3.78  -3.81  -3.73  -3.30 
Road transportation  -3.53  -4.87  -4.91  -4.86  -4.32 
Other transportation  -5.18  -6.62  -6.70  -6.66  -5.97 
Banking and finance  -1.63  -2.72  -2.90  -2.85  -2.38 
General government  -0.08  -0.12  -0.13  -0.13  -0.11 
Education  -1.58  -2.52  -2.52  -2.40  7.29 
Health  -1.50  -2.56  -2.51  -2.52  8.69 
Entertainment  -2.26  -3.86  -4.22  -4.19  -3.29 
Other services  -2.36  -3.65  -4.05  -4.00  -3.36 
 
5.2 Distributional results 
Table 5 summarizes the distributional results of the simulations while figures 2 illustrate the 
impact of each scenario on household real expenditure, income, and household specific consumer 
price index (CPI) for urban and rural households as well as across centiles. The percentage change 
in real expenditure is used to calculate inequality and poverty incidence after each shock (ex-post).  10 | P a g e  
 
Table 5: Summary of distributional results 
















Urban (percent)           
Ex-ante Poverty Incidence  11.370  11.370  11.370  11.370  11.370 
Ex-post Poverty Incidence  12.525  14.002  12.485  11.400  12.311 
Change in Poverty 
Incidence  1.155  2.632 1.115 0.030 0.941
Rural (percent)           
Ex-ante Poverty Incidence  19.510  19.510  19.510  19.510  19.510 
Ex-post Poverty Incidence  20.067  21.341  17.415  19.158  19.864 
Change in Poverty 
Incidence  0.557  1.831 -2.095 -0.352 0.354
Urban + Rural (percent)           
Ex-ante Poverty Incidence  15.803  15.803  15.803  15.803  15.803 
Ex-post Poverty Incidence  16.632  17.999  15.170  15.625  16.424 
Change in Poverty 
Incidence  0.829  2.196 -0.633 -0.178 0.621
Urban           
Ex-ante Gini Coefficient  0.347  0.347 0.347 0.347 0.347
Ex-post Gini Coefficient  0.344  0.352 0.345 0.341 0.346
Change in Gini Coefficient  -0.003  0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001
Rural            
Ex-ante Gini Coefficient  0.277  0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277
Ex-post Gini Coefficient  0.272  0.274 0.258 0.262 0.268
Change in Gini Coefficient  -0.005  -0.003 -0.019 -0.014 -0.009
Urban + Rural           
Ex-ante Gini Coefficient  0.350  0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350
Ex-post Gini Coefficient  0.345  0.350 0.339 0.340 0.344
Change in Gini Coefficient  -0.005  0.000 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006
 
The change in the household nominal income and household specific CPI indicate how the 
expenditure and factor income patterns of each household contribute to the distributional 
results. Household specific CPI is a consumption-weighted average of the price increase of every 
commodity consumed by the respective household. It reflects the contribution of its household 
expenditure pattern and behavior. On the other hand, the change in household income reflects 
the changes in all sources of household income, comprising income from labor by skill types, 
capital, land, and transfers (including from compensation). 
Before the implementation of the energy pricing reform in October 2005, the fuel subsidy was 
long regarded as inequitable. To some extent, Simulation 1 (SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE) supports 
this view. The fuel subsidy on gasoline and diesel has been indeed inequitable, so that cutting the 
subsidy on these vehicle fuels would be a progressive reform.  
The declining pattern of the fall in real expenditure over centiles of expenditure as shown in 
figure 2 suggests the progressivity. This happens in both urban and rural areas. This progressivity 
is driven both by household consumption (by the pattern of the change in household CPI) and 
income pattern (by the pattern of the change in household income). Richer households tend to 
experience  a  greater  increase  in  consumer  price,  reflecting  their  higher  dependence  on  non-11 | P a g e  
 
kerosene vehicle fuel consumption. The fall in their income is also higher compared to poorer 
households, reflecting the adjustment in the factor market which does not favor the factor 
endowment of high income households. 
However, the urban poor is the bigger consumer of kerosene and the actual reform package 
implemented increased its price much more than other fuels. The kerosene administered price 
was drastically increased (185.7 percent), much more than the increase in other fuel prices (87.5 
percent for gasoline, and 104.7 percent for diesel). Simulation 2 attempts to examine whether 
the reform being implemented this way can still be regarded progressive. 
 
Figure 2a. SIM 1 (No Kerosene, No Compensation) 
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Figure 2c. SIM 3 (All fuels, Uniform Cash Compensation) 
 
Figure 2d. SIM 4 (All fuels, Compesation, More to Urban, Less to  Rural) 
 
Figure 2e. SIM 5 (All fuels, Compesation, Price Subsidy on Health and Education) 
The  simulation  produces  a  markedly  different  distributional  story  than  SIM  1  (NO 
KEROSENE). In urban areas, real expenditure of the 20 percent poorest households declines 
within  the  magnitude  of  about  5  to  7  percent,  whereas  the  richest  20  percent  households 
experience  a  decline  of  only  about  2  to  4  percent.  The  pattern  of  the  fall  in  the  real 
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increases in urban areas. 
In contrast, the distributional impact is still slightly progressive in rural areas. Real expen-
diture of the poorest 20% falls by around 3%, while the richest 20% falls by around 4%. Overall, 
the impact reduces inequality. Nationwide (urban and rural areas combined) the October 2005 
package without compensation is neutral with a negligible impact on the Gini coefficient.  
As  Figure  2  suggests,  the  main  driver  of  the  regressive  result  in  urban  areas  is  the 
dependence of urban lower income households on kerosene consumption, as well as on other 
commodities  related  to  fuels  such  as  spending  on  transportation.  This  is  reflected  by  the 
increase  in  their  household  specific  CPI  which  is  far  higher  than  that  of  higher  income 
households. 
As illustrated in Figure 2 both in urban and rural areas, richer households experience more 
adverse income shocks. This indicates the impact of fuel price rises through industry employment 
of capital and labor are biased against urban and richer households. In rural areas, this helps in 
shaping the progressivity of the reform. However, in urban areas, because the impact through 
the consumption pattern is far more severe, the reform cannot avoid being regressive. 
The  October  2005  package  without  compensation  may  have  a  significant  impact  on 
poverty  as  well.  As  shown  in  Figure  3,  poverty  incidence  increases  by  2.63%  in  urban 
areas and by 1.83 percent in rural areas
9. In all, poverty incidence, nation-wide, rises by 2.19 
percent. Using the population data for 2005, it suggests that without compensation the reform 
package could have driven around 5 million people into poverty. The analysis of the `what-if' 
scenarios exercised in SIM 2 suggests that while the reduction in fuel subsidy as part of the 
energy pricing reform has a strong basis in term of economic efficiency, how it is implemented 
is important in relation to the concern about distributional effects. Reducing the fuel subsidy per 
se, without careful prior examination as to how the reform will affect the poor, may generate an 
adverse distributional impact 
The result of SIM 3 (UT) does not support the claim that the cash transfer more than 
compensated for the adverse welfare impact on the poor. It is only true in the case of the rural 
poor. Although some of the poorest centiles of the urban poor gain positive (nominal) income 
because of the transfer, when it is deflated with the increase in their specific CPI, the net real 
expenditure effect is still negative. In urban areas, none of the targeted households experience 
a positive welfare gain. The scheme over-compensates the rural poor and under-compensates the 
urban poor. However, the October 2005 package reduces inequality, especially in rural areas and 
reduces the overall Gini coefficient from. This decline in inequality is driven mainly by the 
significant increase in the real expenditure of the rural poor; the less severe fall in the real 
expenditure of the urban poor (due to the compensation) than the urban non-poor, and the 
sharp decline in the real expenditure of the non-targeted (non-poor or richer) households. 
Figure 4 illustrates the poverty impact of SIM 3 (UT). Due mainly to under-compensation 
of the urban poor, the October 2005 package (with compensation) still cannot prevent urban 
poverty incidence from rising. However, the overall net nationwide impact is a slight decline 
in poverty incidence. As the population is higher in rural areas, the decline in rural poverty 
incidence helps prevent an overall increase in the nation-wide poverty incidence. 
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Figure 3. Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 2 (No Compensation) 
The modification to the compensation scheme by giving more to urban households (SIM 
4 UTUR) may prevent quite a significant number of urban households from falling into poverty, 
and still leaves the poverty incidence in rural areas intact. In this simulation, the poverty incidence 
in urban area increases by a negligible amount, in contrast to 1.11 percent if the amount of money 
is uniform across urban and rural households. In rural areas, poverty incidence still falls. The 
number of people in urban areas falling into poverty due to the reform might have been reduced 
significantly had the compensation been modified in this way. 
The purpose of the compensation scheme is to mitigate the poverty or distributional impact 
of a reform. Naturally, it is not a structural poverty eradication program. The objective of the 
scheme is `to compensate' households for any adverse impact from the reform. Therefore, even if 
the uniform compensation scheme could potentially reduce poverty nation-wide due to the over-
compensation in rural areas, if this was at the cost of a huge increase in poverty in urban area, a 
slightly modified compensation scheme may still be preferable. In terms of policy effectiveness, it 
might even have another advantage by minimizing resistance to the reform due to the fact that 
the urban poor are generally stronger politically than the rural poor. 
SIM 5 (SUB) tries to reveal the likely distributional impact of a price subsidy given to targeted 
households in the form of an education and health subsidy (using the same budget as the cash 
transfers). The results suggests that the inequality impact is neutral in urban areas, progressive in 
rural areas and slightly progressive nationwide. However, because the expansion in the education 
and health sectors increases demand for more skilled-labor and capital, for which higher income 
households have proportionally greater endowments, it drives the regressive  results  through the 
income pattern. The pattern on the fall in household income shows increasing trends toward higher 
income  groups  (see  Figure  2).  In  urban  areas,  the  progressivity  is  weakened  by  the  high 
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Figure 4. Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 3 (With Compensation) 
 
What  most  important,  however,  is  that  the  fall  in  household  purchasing  power  (as 
indicated by the increase in household specific CPI) does not help compensate the poor. Both 
in urban and rural areas, almost all households (including the poor) experience a fall in real 
expenditure. As a result, poverty rises in urban areas. In contrast to the cash transfers, a 
subsidy on education and health as compensation increases poverty in rural areas and because 
most of the poor population is rural, poverty incidence rises nationwide. A subsidy on health and 
education may be good as an incentive for human capital investment, but may not necessarily be 
effective as a means of short-run compensation to mitigate the adverse poverty impact of a 
energy  pricing  reform.  It  may  be  better  suited  for  longer-term  objectives,  especially  if 
combined with policies to promote education spending by modifying the expenditure pattern or 
demand behavior toward education, especially for rural households. However, this is a longer-
term approach of a structural poverty alleviation program, not an ad-hoc occasional compensation 
scheme to minimize the short term distributional cost of a particular reform such as energy 
pricing. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
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The Indonesian government implemented a massive fuel price increase in 2005. While the 
benefit of the reform on efficiency grounds has been widely acknowledged, whether the reform 
was equitable is still debated. 
This question is answered in this case study using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model with disaggregated households that allows for a rich and accurate distributional story. 
With this method, the analysis is carried out on the recent energy pricing reform in Indonesia 
(October 2005 Package) using various counter-factual scenarios. 
The simulations suggest the reform could be progressive if only `vehicle fuel' prices are 
increased. However, if the price of domestic fuel (kerosene) is also increased at the magnitude 
implemented in October 2005, this would tend to increase inequality, especially in urban areas. 
From  the  comparison  of  various  different  scenarios  it  may  be  concluded  that  proper  and 
effective compensation is important to mitigate the distributional cost or poverty impact of 
the reform. 
Uniform cash transfers to poor households without regard to their heterogeneity tend to over-
compensate the rural poor but under-compensate the urban poor. Other results suggest non-
cash compensation in the form of subsidizing the education and health spending of the poor, may 
not  be effective  in  mitigating  the  reform despite  its  possible  desirability as a longer-term 
poverty alleviation program. 
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1 See for example NEF (2004) 
2 Among others are Azis (2006), Oktaviani et al. (2005), and many other commentators in the media. 
3 Kerosene for domestic household use was not increased. 
4 It used The INDOCEEM model,an Indonesian CGE model based on ORANI-G developed initially by 
Monash University and the Indonesian Ministry of Energy. 
5 For more detail description of the model please refer to Yusuf (2007). 
6 To exactly represent the rate of the price increase as announced by the government on the 1st of 
October 2005, in the simulation, the price of fuels is set exogenously and the subsidy rate is set to be 
determined endogenously in the model. 
7 Poverty line is calculated based on this official poverty incidence. This poverty line then will be used to 
calculate ex-post poverty incidence from ex-post distribution of real expenditure per capita. The calculation of 
poverty incidence is all in real term based on the change in real expenditure per capita. Real poverty line then 
is a constant. 
8 At the 2003 price level, since the model database is using SAM 2003. For comparison with the actual 
amount of transfers, it is calculated that with 19.2 million households as beneficiaries, the actual amount at 
the 2005 price level will be around Rp 23 trillion rupiah. 
9 Note that poverty line in Figure 3 does not change due to the shocks because all variables are in real 
terms. 